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QUIT-for-TAT and the Endogenous Structure of Cooperation in 
Voluntary Dilemmas 
T.K. Ahn, Seoul National University 
John T. Scholz, Florida State University 
 
ABSTRACT 
The ability to select and reject partners creates a powerful means of supporting 
cooperation when a common set of actors faces repeated possibilities for playing the prisoner’s 
dilemmas with each other, a common situation that we refer to as a voluntary dilemma.  The 
cooperative quit-for-tat (QFT) strategy that maintains all relationships with mutually cooperative 
partners but quits any relationship after a defection can maintain cooperation in voluntary 
dilemmas by joining together and excluding nasty and exploitative strategies.  We develop the 
implications of the QFT model for the dynamics and structure of mutual cooperation, and test 
these implications in an experimental voluntary dilemma.  The results confirm that the simple 
QFT model accounts for observed dynamics and structure of cooperative relationships, and that 
high-scoring subjects follow strategies that resemble QFT.  We discuss the relative importance of 
niceness, forgiveness, and optimistic search in accounting for the success of QFT strategies, and 
note that the observed clustering of cooperators in this experimental setting is an artifact rather 
than a necessary support for cooperation. 
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How do government agencies learn to cooperate with others on mutually-advantageous 
joint projects in newly-emergent policy arenas?  How do legislative sponsors or academic 
coauthors find trustworthy collaborators?  How can individuals, firms and agencies gain the 
advantages of specialization required for collaborative high-value exchanges while avoiding the 
associated risks imposed by opportunistic partners?  These situations involve voluntary dilemmas 
in which the opportunities for high-value exchanges are constrained by problems of moral hazard 
and adverse selection.   
We investigate these questions in the context of laboratory experiments in which subjects 
propose who they want to play with in each period, and may play multiple prisoner’s dilemma 
games in each period whenever both subjects propose to each other.  Subjects may choose 
different strategies in games with different partners. The result can lead to repeated mutual 
cooperation among consenting partners, but it can also lead to no collaboration when either 
partner refuses to play or to a repeated “market for lemons” (Akerlof 1970) in which safer low 
value exchanges (mutual defection) drive out riskier high value exchanges, thereby reducing the 
potential gains from exchange.  
We analyze a self-organizing solution to this problem in which high-value traders 
independently follow strategies that create communities of cooperation and banish low value 
traders to “Nash-ville,” a ghetto of defectors.  The critical requirement for this solution is that 
high-value traders play “Quit-for -Tat” (QFT), an extension of the well-known “Tit-for-Tat” 
strategy of the prisoners’ dilemma that has been applied to the realm of involuntary dilemmas.  
QFT players exchange high-value goods, or cooperate, in any new exchange and continue to 
trade and cooperate until the partner defects by exchanging an inferior good.  QFT then ceases to 
3 
 
trade with that partner, and seeks others instead. When multiple players use the QFT strategy a 
dense, overlapping network of cooperation can endogenously evolve. 
We provide experimental evidence that this trial and error strategy explains the evolution 
of cooperative communities formed by the most successful subjects in the repeated voluntary 
dilemma game.  We find that the QFT partner selection process yields the dense, overlapping 
networks of reciprocation among cooperators associated with the social capital perspective 
(Coleman 1987, 1988, Putnam 1993).  However, in voluntary dilemmas it is the partner selection 
process that incidentally produces dense networks of cooperators, not the dense networks that 
produce cooperation.  The ability of QFT to support Pareto superior solutions by selecting 
appropriate partners is another instance of the general evolutionary selection process noted for 
other types of games (Skyrms and Pemantle 2000). 
We first argue that the kinds of risky high-value exchanges involved when government 
agencies seek collaborators, when authors seek coauthors, or when firms seek alliances is best 
represented by the voluntary dilemma in which players can choose and reject partners from a 
pool of potential players.  We then consider the simple solution provided by QFT, and use this 
perspective to analyze the results of a voluntary dilemma experiment.  The results confirm the 
power of QFT both to allow subjects to maintain cooperative payoffs in the experiment and to 
predict the observed patterns of exchange shaped by the QFT search strategy.  We discuss the 
implications of this and related research for self-organizing collaboration in the absence of 
institutional support. 
Cooperation in Voluntary Dilemmas  
Our analysis of cooperation in voluntary dilemmas explores the general propositions that 
exchange can enhance an actor’s welfare, that greater gains generally require riskier exchanges, 
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and that opportunism associated with risky exchanges may require institutional support to make 
risky exchanges possible (North 1990, Williamson 1985).  Although the project was initially 
designed to investigate cooperation among government agencies, the generic problem affects all 
forms of risky exchange. In the policy field, the problem arises whenever agencies attempt to 
negotiate agreements to mitigate negative externalities and enhance positive externalities 
imposed by one agency’s policies on others (Steinacker 2010).  For example, decisions by a 
water supply authority to pump more groundwater can reduce stream flows, increasing the 
concentration of contaminants to levels above thresholds set by an environmental protection 
agency; two agencies that “exchange” tradeoffs in policies they control individually can 
maximize their joint benefits, but at the risk of losses if one of the partners proves unreliable 
(Scholz, Berardo and Kile 2008).    
 Smaller projects that take advantage of each partner’s existing specialized authority, 
resources and knowledge can provide some joint gain with relatively little risk whenever partners 
together can create a better project or policy than either could develop on their own, so low-risk 
exchanges are generally unproblematic.  However, more ambitious projects to tackle 
externalities with greater potential gains will generally require the development of greater 
technical and administrative capabilities and their dedicated deployment to a unique situation.  
Once these resources are committed and the agency is locked in to the project, other partners can 
potentially maximize their profits by shirking on their commitments to take advantage of the 
agency’s investments that are locked in to the project.   
Arend and Seale (2005) model this alliance process among businesses as an iterated 
prisoners’ dilemma (IPD) with an exit option.   Each partner makes a series of decisions about 
the level of resources to commit to the activity that are irreversible in the short run, but can be 
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discontinued contingent on the behavior of other partners.  In each period a partner decides 
between a cooperative but risky high level investment and a shirking but risk-free low level of 
investment.  Both levels are selected to maximize joint output if all partners invested at the same 
level, with the shirking level set by the Nash equilibrium.   As in any IPD, mutual cooperation 
produces higher expected payoffs than mutual shirking, but shirkers gain the highest overall 
payoffs and cooperators the lowest if partners choose different strategies.  Although decisions at 
each stage must be made with no clear assurance about the partners’ levels of investment, the 
history of the partnership and the threat of termination provide some support for mutual 
cooperation.  In order to represent the policy example, the voluntary dilemma model extends the 
alliance model by allowing actors to select possible alliance partners among a fixed set of actors 
involved in mutually interacting policy arenas (cf. Seale, Arend and Phelan 2006).   
Experimental Voluntary Dilemmas 
To provide a more precise example of the voluntary dilemma to be explored, we next 
describe the experiment that will be used to test the empirical implications of the QFT model.1
                                                          
1 The experiment assesses the relative effectiveness of three different reputational 
mechanisms that provide information about other players, as described fully and analyzed in 
Ahn, Esarey and Scholz (2009). They find that a condition in which cooperators could share 
information about other cooperators outperforms other information-sharing mechanisms, and 
they analyze differences in the provision and utilization of reputational information to account 
for the result.  We now analyze the results to test the potential role of QFT in explaining the 
relatively high levels of cooperation across all conditions.   
  
The experimental voluntary dilemma was designed in part to reflect the conditions in a relatively 
new policy arena (cf. Scholz, Bererdo and Kile 2008) in which opportunities for both low and 
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high risk collaboration abound among a small set of subjects who have not yet engaged in 
collaboration.  Subjects have limited resources for collaboration and initially have no knowledge 
about the behavior of other subjects.  To simplify the analysis, the experiment is limited to 2-
person exchanges. 
The experiment involves 14 subjects who choose partners and play two-person prisoner’s 
dilemmas for 20 periods.  In each period, subjects can propose a partnership to any number of 
other subjects, and an alliance is formed whenever both subjects propose to each other.  The 
partners then play an iterated prisoners’ dilemma (IPD) as long as both partners continue to 
propose to play with each other, which provides either partner with the option to exit the alliance 
simply by not proposing in the next period.  To reflect the many opportunities for exchange in 
relatively new policy arenas, even low-risk trades (mutual defection in the PD) provide positive 
payoffs.  To represent the limited capability of partners to expand their exchange alliances in 
these policy arenas, marginal costs for maintaining each exchange increase as new alliances are 
added.  Thus the number of partners sought by a subject will be limited, with the optimal number 
dependent on the payoffs per exchange.  As we will see, the increasing cost limitation plays a 
critical role in shaping the emergent patterns of high-value exchange. 
The experiment allows 14 subjects in each session to simultaneously make proposals for 
exchanges with any of the other subjects without knowing the proposals of the other subjects.  If 
two subjects propose each other, an exchange takes place in the current period.  Each player then 
chooses between providing a low-value and a high-value investment in the project in the current 
period.  If both choose the high value investment, both receive payoffs of 75 Experimental 
Currency Units (ECUs where 400 ECUs=$1).  If both choose the low value investment, both 
receive 25 ECUs, representing the positive value of low-value exchanges even at the shirker’s 
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equilibrium.  If one invests the high-value while the other invests the low value, the one 
providing the low value gains the highest payoff of 100 while the other gains nothing from the 
exchange.  Since the marginal cost of exchange2
 This procedure is repeated for a total of 20 periods of exchange.  In each period subjects 
repeat the process of proposing to specific partners and of exchanging when mutual proposals are 
made.  Thus each partner can unilaterally terminate any exchange at the end of any period by 
simply not proposing to the same subject.  They can try to maintain the relationship by proposing 
to the same player, but the other player must also propose to the subject for the relationship to be 
maintained.   
 increases with the number of exchanges, 
payoffs for mutual low-value exchanges reach their optimal level at four for a net payoff of 
(4x25)-39.6=60.4 ECUs in a given period.  High-value exchanges support up to ten exchanges 
worth (10x75)-356.4=393.6 ECUs before the additional exchange would cost more than it would 
return in gross payoffs. 
The experiment contained three different reputational mechanisms).   The baseline 
condition provided no information apart from the subject’s own experience.  The local condition 
allowed subjects to ask their exchange partners for recommendations, while the central condition 
allowed subjects to post recommendations on a central information board where other subjects 
could request the recommendations for any other subject.  Four sessions were run for each of 
three conditions.  The 168 subjects were recruited from social science courses at -----, and earned 
performance-based payoffs averaging $20-$25 for sessions that lasted from 60 to 90 minutes. An 
earlier analysis (Ahn, Esarey and Scholz 2009) found that the local condition outperforms other 
information-sharing mechanisms because of the coupling of the information provision dilemma 
                                                          
2 This is modeled as a cost function c = 4.4 (n – 1)2 for n > 0 and c = 0 if n = 0, where n is 
a  non-negative integer indicating the number of exchanges the player has in a period.  
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with the original exchange dilemma. We now analyze the results to test the extent to which the 
QFT model predicts the observed patterns of cooperation.  
The Quit-For-Tat Model of Cooperation 
The QFT model extends the logic of the well-known “tit-for-tat” (TFT) strategy in IPD to 
explore the ability of a “quit-for-tat” strategy to foster cooperation in voluntary dilemmas.  Like 
TFT, the QFT strategy is both nice and vengeful in the new context (Bendor and Swistak 1997).  
It is nice because it always cooperates until it meets a defector, and it is vengeful because it exits 
any relationship immediately if the partner defects and never proposes to play with that partner 
in the future.  The pure QFT strategy thus resembles the “grim trigger” strategy (cooperate until 
your partner defects, and then never cooperate again), but we later consider more forgiving 
alternatives willing to accept more than one defection before exiting.  
Nice, vengeful strategies have the advantage of requiring the lowest clustering proportion 
in evolutionary games based on IPD and other similar games (Bendor and Swistak 1997).  That 
is, strategies like TFT and grim trigger can guarantee survival (under proportionate fitness 
selection rules) as long as they comprise a threshold level of a fully mixed infinite population, 
whereas nasty strategies like always defect (AllD) require greater proportions before they can 
guarantee survival.  Any clustering mechanism that increases the ability of nice, vengeful 
strategies to interact more frequently with each other will increase the proportion of mutual 
cooperation payoffs to mutual defection, thus increasing their survival advantage over AllD (e.g., 
Axelrod 1981).  In smaller populations, the advantage of TFT translates into a higher probability 
that TFT rather than AllD will take over the population (Nowak 2006). In noisy evolutionary 
processes, this evolutionary advantage ensures that small populations will spend more time 
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dominated by TFT than by AllD, with the ratio of domination determined by the ratio of payoffs. 
(Fudenberg and Imhof 2006)  
Nice, vengeful strategies can also support cooperation in the amended IPD when an exit 
option is added.  Hirschliefer and Rasmusen (1989) demonstrate that “out-for-tat”, a simple 
extension of the TFT strategy that always cooperates and simply exits from the relationship 
whenever the partner defects, can support mutual cooperation in IPD with exit for both 2-person 
games and n-person extensions.  They assume a fixed value for the exit option, but other studies 
have explored the advantages of “out-for-tat” for various contexts that can alter the value of the 
exit option. 3
The cooperator’s advantage and the value of exit may change, however, when exit from 
one relationship leads to the beginning of another series of games played with a random draw 
from the available pool, as in the voluntary dilemma.  When exit leads to a random draw of a 
new partner, for example, nice strategies can be exploited by “roving defectors” who defect in 
 For example, Orbell and Dawes (1991) provide experimental evidence that the 
ability to opt out can create a cooperators’ advantage even in one-shot games.  They find that 
potential defectors are pessimists who think that others are likely to defect, and are thus 
considerably more likely to opt out whenever the payoff for not playing exceeds the expected 
Nash equilibrium payoff from mutual defection.   Cooperators, on the other hand, are optimistic 
in expecting others to cooperate, and therefore prefer to play whenever the exit option is lower 
than that for mutual cooperation.  Optimistic cooperators thus choose to play at much higher 
frequencies, leading to higher payoffs for those who do choose to play.   
                                                          
3 Various exit options are explored in laboratory experiments (Biele and Reiskamp 2008, 
Boone and Macy 1999, Coricelli, Fehr and Fellner 2004, Seale, Arend and Phelan 2006), 
Axelrod-type tournaments of strategies (Hayashi and Yamagichi 1998), and agent-based models 
of the evolution of cooperation (Hanaki et al 2007, Hruschka and Henrich 2006, Takahishi 
2000).   
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the first round and then quit (Boone and Macy 1999, Dugatkin and Wilson 1991).  Exit in this 
case allows roving defectors to maximally exploit nice strategies by exiting before retaliatory 
punishment can be imposed.   
 “Quit-for-Tat”, the Cooperative Community, and Nash-ville 
The QFT model of voluntary dilemmas extends this literature on cooperation by 
exploring the potential ability of cooperators who can choose their partners to endogenously 
create their own cooperative community that protects against roving defectors by banishing them 
to Nash-ville, a community that shares the Nash-dominant mutual defection outcome.  While 
most studies have explored how clustering influences strategy choice or the emergent frequency 
of cooperative strategies, the QFT model analyzes how partner selection can endogenously 
evolve clusters capable of sustaining mutual cooperation.  
Network analysis provides a useful foundation for analyzing the emergent structures of 
cooperation in voluntary dilemmas settings.  Each player in the voluntary dilemma is represented 
as a node, and each game played between players is represented as a link between the two 
players.  An ego network consists of a given player (ego) and all partners (alters) linked to ego 
by a game.  Consider the emergent structure for a simple voluntary dilemma model in which 
fixed populations of QFT confront the voluntary dilemma equivalent of the IPD “all defect” 
strategy that always defects and never quits (DNQ).  A QFT player will continue to terminate 
partnerships with DNQ and search for other QFT players until the optimal number of mutual 
cooperation exchanges is reached. DNQ never quits, but can never maintain relationships with 
QFT, so it eventually gets paired with the optimal number of mutual defectors.   
Pairwise Stability, QFT, and the Structure of Cooperation 
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One means of analyzing the structure of cooperation is based on the concept of a pairwise 
stable equilibrium for choice process in which individual pairs are free to change links at a given 
moment, but cannot coordinate with other pairs (cf. Snijder’s 2001 actor-oriented model).  
Pairwise stability requires that no two players can both be made better off by either dropping a 
current link between them or adding a new link (Jackson 2008). Any pairwise stable equilibrium 
structure of links in the voluntary dilemma would segregate QFT and DNQ in separate 
populations, since QFT always prefers to break ties with DNQ.  At least one pairwise stable 
equilibrium exists in the experimental setting in which QFT and DNQ form two separate rings, 
with each QFT player linked to (up to) the nearest five neighbors in both directions in their ring 
and each DNQ player linked to the nearest two neighbors in both directions.   
Whenever the population of QFT is smaller than the optimal number of partners, only a 
fully-linked cluster containing all QFT would be pairwise stable.  In our experiment with a total 
population of 14, for example, all QFT players would seek to link to all others whenever there 
are 11 or fewer QFT players in the population.  In this case, pairwise stability in the QFT model 
would predict a fully-linked cluster of all QFT players with no links to the DNQ players.  
For larger populations facing the same payoffs, no structure will be pairwise stable as 
long as there are two QFT players with fewer than ten links each with other QFT players or two 
DNQ with fewer than four DNQ links.  For either strategy, the two similar strategies would both 
be better off linking with each other, so by definition the structure would not be pairwise stable. 
Thus the cooperator’s advantage is enormous in any pairwise stable structure as long as there are 
enough QFT players since QFT receives the higher mutual cooperation payoff from up to ten 
players minus the cost of ten links while DNQ receives the lower mutual defection payoff from 
only four players.  The payoffs in the experiment provide a big cooperators’ advantage, since 
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QFT will outscore DNQ as long as there is at least 1 other QFT player in the experiment (Min 
QFT=75, Max DNQ=60.4).  
In sum, the basic QFT model applied to our experimental setting implies that:  
H1: cooperators (QFT) and defectors (DNQ) will form segregated clusters.,  
H2:  average payoffs will be considerably higher among cooperator populations than 
among defectors.  
The Dynamics of Partner Search  
Given sufficient time, it is plausible to expect a fully-connected cluster of QFT players 
segregated from the DNQ population to emerge.  On the other hand, most plausible dynamic 
processes of partner selection in a large population would be unlikely to exactly generate the 
unusual double ring outcome noted above as one potential pairwise stable equilibrium.  There are 
most likely many interesting pairwise stable structures of cooperative relationships implicit in the 
QFT model that are worth exploring, and the expected frequency of these structures would 
depend on the nature of the partner search process defined in an extended model.   
The potential complexity of this dynamic process requires us to limit our inquiry to the 
specific conditions in our experiment and to simple search processes.  Specifically, we consider 
only the case of a new exchange arena in which no exchange relationships exist and nothing is 
known initially about any potential partners.  Consider an introspective partner selection 
extension of QFT and DNQ based on Orbell and Dawes (1991). If introspective choice strategy 
myopically assumes that other strategies will do what the strategy itself intends to do,  the more 
optimistic QFT will make considerably more proposals in the early rounds than will the 
pessimistic DNQ since QFT seeks 10 mutual cooperation links compared to DNQ’s  four mutual 
defection links.  In each succeeding round both strategies will make fewer proposals as they gain 
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permanent partners sharing their strategy and thus seek fewer new partners.  The process will 
continue until some pairwise stable structure is reached, at which time no one has an incentive to 
make additional proposals.  Even this simple process provides one testable hypothesis:  QFT 
strategies with more aggressive early search will most quickly establish the optimal number of 
mutual cooperation partnerships, thereby earning the higher payoffs for a longer period of time.   
The optimal search strategy for QFT will be influenced by the relative frequency of QFT 
and other strategies in the population as well as by the information available about other 
strategies.  For example, aggressive search provides an additional advantage for QFT when 
roving defectors are present in addition to DNQ.  Unlike DNQ, roving defectors prefer seeking 
new suckers over preserving relationships of mutual defection.  As QFT and DNQ strategies 
respectively increase the number of stable relationships over time, they reduce the proposals 
made to new partners.  Since roving bandits continually seek new partners, they increasingly 
dominate the pool making proposals to new partners.  In each succeeding period, QFT faces a 
higher likelihood of encountering the sucker’s payoff.  At the same time, both the likelihood and 
the remaining value of gaining another cooperative partner decreases, particularly since each 
additional partner increases the costs of all remaining partnerships. Risk-averse QFT may stop 
searching for new cooperative partners in this environment even though the number of current 
partners falls short of what is theoretically optimal. Thus QFT strategies that aggressively search 
in the more favorable early rounds enjoy both a higher likelihood of encountering QFT and a 
greater remaining value for the established relationships. 
At some point in this process, the expected loss of proposing to a nasty new partner is 
likely to exceed the expected gain from finding a nice new partner, and the optimal search 
strategy for QFT would stop seeking new partners.  Thus search costs in nasty environments may 
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stop partner acquisition far short of long-term optimal number of QFT partners.  To defend 
against the threat of roving defectors, QFT strategies in the cooperator community in effect 
lower the community’s gates after the first several periods of selection, relegating an increasing 
concentration of nasty strategies to deal with each other in Nash-ville. 
Search costs are affected not only by the frequency and type of strategies, but also by the 
mechanism through which subjects can learn about potential partners.  For example, the local 
experimental condition allows players to ask current partners for recommendations about new 
potential partners.  This information mechanism would allow QFT strategies already involved in 
mutual cooperation to share recommendations, thereby considerably reducing search costs for 
new QFT partners.  As a result of lower search costs, we would expect QFT strategies in the 
local condition to more readily overcome the roving defector problem, establish more mutual 
cooperation, and outperform their counterparts in conditions with less informational support.4
Furthermore, effective sharing of information would strongly encourage clustering if 
each QFT player recommends all known QFT partners to each other; all QFT partners of player 
A in period one would propose to all others and establish mutual cooperation with them by 
period two (at least up to the optimum mutual cooperation limits).  Even in large populations 
where the likelihood that player A’s QFT partners would by chance discover each other is small, 
the local information mechanism can create the fully-linked cooperative clusters that are 
assumed to support cooperation in the social capital literature (Coleman 1988; Scholz and 
Berardo 2010).  But note that in the QFT model the clustering is a product of the information 
mechanism, an artifact that by definition does not alter the propensity of QFT to cooperate.  
  
                                                          
4 Although a central information condition could potentially provide an equally valuable 
support for QFT, the central mechanism implemented in the experiment was not successful due 
to subjects’ inability to solve the information provision dilemma involving the entire population 
(Ahn, Esarey and Scholz 2009).  
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In sum, the empirically-testable implications of the introspective QFT model and the 
dynamics of search in the experimental setting include 
H3: Cooperators will select more new partners than will defectors in early rounds, and 
will select fewer new partners as the number of mutually cooperative links grows; 
  H4: Optimistic cooperators who aggressively seek new partners in early rounds will 
outscore pessimistic cooperators who will need to seek cooperators in an increasingly nasty 
environment; and  
H5: Cooperators in the local experimental condition will exhibit tighter clustering and 
will outperform cooperators in the other conditions. 
Forgiveness in Noisy and Nasty Environments 
The most critical aspect of QFT is the niceness that preserves mutual cooperation with all 
other nice strategies.  Like its TFT namesake, however, QFT may perform poorly in noisy and 
nasty environments (Bendor and Mookherjee 1987) in which more forgiving QFT strategies 
would perform better against a wider variety of both nice and nasty strategies.  If strategies 
sometimes make mistakes in noisy environments, for example, a single mistake by a QFT partner 
would eliminate that partner from all future interactions.  Then QFT would have to take the 
chance of trying to locate a new QFT partner, and in small populations QFT would eventually 
end up with no partners at all.  A forgiving QFT that would only break with a partner after two 
defections would mitigate this problem.  In addition, forgiving QFT could potentially convert 
into cooperators the suspicious strategies that defect first but respond to prior-round cooperation 
with cooperation.  This conversion would add to the pool of potential cooperators that would not 
be available to unforgiving QFT.   
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On the other hand, forgiveness in this case comes at the expense of vengefulness; 
forgiving QFT is exploited twice rather than just one before breaking links with strategies like 
DNQ.  This exposure to exploitation would provide an unnecessary cost if QFT partners are 
relatively easy to locate, so the advantage of forgiveness for QFT thus depends on conditions in 
which QFT players are either prone to making mistakes or are difficult to locate.  In addition, 
forgiveness imposes a greater disadvantage on QFT in the early stages of new exchange arenas, 
since the added time spent with a defector postpones search in an increasingly nasty pool of 
available partners. Finally, forgiveness does little good in extremely nasty environments unless 
coupled with the vengeance of TFT—that is, if it maintains links with defectors but defects until 
the partner cooperates.  In very nasty environments TFT would at least be able to gain the profit 
from four mutual defection links that DNQ earns, while an unforgiving QFT suffers the suckers 
payoff from continuous search.  
In short, the role of forgiveness is not as clear as the role for niceness in the success of 
QFT strategies, particularly in nasty environments.  The testable implications for our experiment 
are 
H6: Observed cooperative strategies are likely to vary more in forgiveness than in 
niceness; and 
H7. QFT without forgiveness will outperform more forgiving QFT as long as the 
environment is sufficiently nice.   
Testing the Structural Implications of the QFT Model 
 The dynamic process of cooperators clustering together over time and banishing 
defectors from their cluster (H1) can be seen in the period 17 snapshot of cooperation and 
defection choices in Figure 1.  Each of the four sociograms represents a different session of the 
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local condition—the same patterns emerge in the other two conditions as well, although they are 
not quite as clear.  Circles represent each of the 14 subjects in each session, with the size of the 
circle representing total earnings over all periods. Solid grey arrows represent a choice of the 
subject at the base of the arrow to cooperate with the subject indicated by the arrowhead; dotted 
lines represent the choice to defect.  No arrow is present when players do not play.  The circles 
have been placed to emphasize the two groupings that have emerged in each session, with the 
tightly-connected circle composing the community of cooperators and a more dispersed 
peripheral group composing the Nash-ville of defectors.  The clustering of cooperators and 
banishment of defectors to Nash-ville arises from the stability of mutual cooperation ties and 
instability of ties with defectors, as can be readily observed in a dynamic view of relationships 
over the 20 periods in the online appendix (appended for reviewers as Appendix 1).  
H1: Cooperators and Defectors Form Separate Populations 
To confirm the tendency to form two separate populations and identify members of each 
for comparison purposes, we used the TABU clustering algorithm in UCINET (Borgatti et al. 
2002) to partition each session into two groups that maximize the similarity of linkage patterns 
or associations within each of the two groups based on the sum of game links observed in the ten 
periods (8-17) prior to period 18, when endgame effects become evident.  This timeframe allows 
us to observe the pattern of established exchanges after the early-round sorting occurs and before 
the endgame effects.  Note that decisions to cooperate or defect play no role in defining the 
partition that depends only on game links.  Significant partitions were found for ten of the twelve 
sessions, with partitions being most significant in the local condition and least significant in the 
central condition sessions, where two sessions did not produce significant partitions.   
H2: QFT Cooperators Outscore Defecting Nash-ville Subjects 
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Differences in cooperation and payoff levels between the two clusters are as striking as 
suggested by the QFT model, confirming both that the two clusters correspond to cooperators 
and defector populations and that cooperators outperform defectors (H2).  Figure 2 compares the 
proportion of cooperation choices across all games (including games both within and between 
communities) in each period for members of the partitions that correspond to the cooperator 
community and Nash-ville in each experimental condition.  The patterns for mutual cooperation 
and for average payoffs are very similar and support the same conclusions, so are not displayed. 5
Figure 2 provides evidence that the higher average performance of the local condition 
that was reported and analyzed in Ahn, Esarey and Scholz (2009) is almost fully accounted for 
by the enhanced performance of the cooperator community, since they outscore cooperators in 
both other information conditions and there is relatively little difference across conditions in the 
  
The cooperative communities score dramatically higher than their Nash-ville counterparts on all 
measures, with cooperators in the local condition approaching full cooperation and the baseline 
and central conditions ranking respectively lower.   The commonly-observed endgame drop in 
cooperation in the last few rounds is evident in all partitions; since subjects knew that the game 
lasted 20 periods, the expected decrease in cooperation indicates that cooperation is conditional 
on expected future payoffs and not due to unconditional altruism even for subjects in the 
cooperators cluster.   
                                                          
5 Across all conditions, high value exchanges (mutual cooperation) occur ten times more 
frequently (2069 vs. 206) than low value exchanges within the cooperator community, while low 
value exchanges (mutual defection) occur over three times more frequently (1391 vs. 412) than 
high value exchanges within Nash-ville.  Support for high value exchange is particularly striking 
in the local condition, with the percentage of all high value exchanges (mutual cooperation) in 
the session that occur within the cooperator community being 82.7% (1203 of 1454 games), 75% 
(501 of 668), and 50.2% (365 of 727) for the local, baseline, and central conditions, respectively.  
The proportion of low value exchanges (mutual defection) in the session that occur within Nash-
ville is more similar across conditions at 66.8% (533 of 821), 64.9% (368 of 551), and 69.5% 
( 490 of 705) respectively. 
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more uncooperative Nash-ville.  By allowing cooperators to recommend each other, the partner-
based information exchange appears to accelerate and stabilize the selection process of QFT 
strategies that creates the cooperative community and bans defectors to Nash-ville (H5).  The 
information differences across conditions appear to have little effect on members of Nash-ville, 
where there are no such systematic differences in cooperation and in earnings.   
H3. Cooperators aggressively seek ties in early rounds, but not in later rounds. 
The difference in search for new partners between cooperator and defector communities 
is illustrated clearly in the comparison of the highest scoring cooperators cluster (session 3) and 
lowest scoring Nash-ville (session 2) in the local condition provided in Figure 3—the more 
general case will be considered later.  The horizontal axis represents the periods, while the 
vertical axis represents the average number of each type of proposal made in each period per 
member.  A triangle indicates the number of proposals made in the period to new partners not 
linked in the previous period, while a circle indicates proposals made to partners linked in the 
previous period who cooperated and an “x” indicates proposals to partners who defected. The 
solid line indicates the average number of links that were established in each period as a result of 
these proposals.  Note that the total number of proposals generally exceeds the number of links 
because links are only formed when the proposed partner has simultaneously proposed to the 
subject. 
 In confirmation of H4, the cooperators cluster in Figure 3 reflects the introspective QFT 
strategy that aggressively proposes to many new partners (triangles) in the first few rounds, but 
increasingly limits proposals exclusively to cooperating partners (circles) as the number of 
cooperating partners increase.  Cooperators seldom propose to defecting partners (“x”), and 
practically stop searching for new links after establishing six to seven stable cooperative 
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exchanges.  At this point the increasing marginal costs of links makes the expected value of a 
new link less tempting, since several periods of mutual cooperation with a seventh or eighth 
partner would be required to compensate for a single period of becoming a sucker.6
Subjects in the Nash-ville cluster in Figure 3 initially propose to fewer new partners than 
the cooperative cluster does, as suggested by the introspective DNQ strategy (H3).  However, 
they do not follow the expectation that over time DNQ would increase proposals to defecting 
partners to the optimum four low-value exchanges and consequently reduce proposals to new 
partners.  If anything, proposals to new partners increase over time, while proposals to prior 
defectors remain below two until the final periods. The continuing high number of new proposals 
and low number of proposals to defectors in this worst-performing Nash-ville cluster suggests 
the instability of mutual defection relationships favored by DNQ,
 As in the 
previous figure, endgame effects appear to affect the stability of cooperative links in the later 
periods.  
7
The combined patterns in Figure 3 illustrates a tendency for new proposals in later rounds 
to come increasingly from the less cooperative players in Nash-ville and very few from the 
cooperative community, in which case the proportion of proposers who are nasty will increase 
 and represents instead a 
pattern more consistent with a roving defector strategy that prefers to seek new suckers rather 
than to stick with known defectors. 
                                                          
6 The marginal cost of an eighth partner is 61.6 given the link cost function 4.4(n-1)^2. A 
player with 7 mutually cooperative links proposes to an eighth in a session and gets the sucker’s 
payoff of 0 incurs a pure cost of 61.6. Even when an eighth partner turns out to be a cooperator, 
the net benefit is 75-61.6=13.4. Thus, five periods of mutual cooperation with a cooperative 
eighth partner are necessary to compensate for a single defection encountered while searching 
for an eighth cooperative partner.) 
7 The average .75 probability (reported in Table 1) that a Nash-ville subject will propose 
to a defecting partner would correspond to slightly more than an even chance that a low-value 
exchange will last more than one round, which is much lower than would be expected from DNQ. 
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over time.8
Testing the Strategic Dimensions of QFT: Niceness, Search, and Forgiveness 
  This supports the contention that more optimistic or aggressive search in early 
periods will improve the performance of QFT strategies in this small, fixed population (H4), as 
will be further examined.   In addition, the increasing nastiness in available partners over time 
further clarifies why even the most successful cooperators cluster portrayed in Figure 3 achieves 
only seven enduring relationships of mutual cooperation, far short of the optimal level of ten.  As 
the environment becomes increasingly nasty, the expected cost of encountering a nasty strategy 
more rapidly outweigh the future gains from a successful search.    
 The analysis to this point has compared behavior and performance of the two 
communities to predictions of the QFT model.  We next focus on the observed strategies of 
individual community members to see whether strategies of subjects in the cooperators 
community actually resemble QFT and to test the relative effectiveness of QFT’s niceness, 
forgiveness, and search in earning high payoffs in the experiment.  
Representing Strategy Types We categorize observed strategies by extending a simple 
representation from evolutionary game theory (e.g., Nowak 2006) that allows us to identify the 
critical QFT dimensions of niceness, forgiveness, and search.9
                                                          
8 Overall, the two highest scoring groups decrease their probability of proposing to new 
partners from about .5 in the first 3 periods to around .1 in periods 15-17, and the probability of 
cooperating with a new partner for the two lowest-scoring groups decreases from around .3 to 
less than .05 in the corresponding periods. 
  This class of one-period 
strategies specifies the probability that the strategy will cooperate after each possible state 
reached in the previous period, which in IPD includes the probability of cooperation if the other 
9 Note that TFT, forgiving TFT, grim, allC and allD can all be represented by extreme 
values in a continuous representation of strategies (e.g., Nowak 2006).   Including both ego and 
partner’s choice to create five possible previous period outcomes (No Game, CC, CD, DC, and 
DD) turned out not to produce different results than the simpler model, so we base our analysis 
on the three category classification of previous outcomes based on the partner’s choice.   
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player cooperated, defected, or did not play in the previous period.  For voluntary dilemmas in 
which proposals are also made, we extend the specification to include the probability of 
proposing to a player who cooperated, or defected, or did not play in the previous round. 
Table 1 reports the average probabilities for each element of the strategy observed during 
the first five periods of play for the categories of subjects identified in each row.  The last 
columns in the table also report average total earnings over the full 20 periods in ECUs and the 
observed number of mutual cooperation outcomes in period five.  These columns provide a 
comparison of performance for the observed strategies associated with each subject type.  
The first six columns report probabilities for each strategic dimension, with the first three 
columns reporting the probabilities associated with niceness.  Column 1 reports the average 
probability of cooperating (C) with new players after no play in the previous period, column 2 
the probability of proposing to a player who cooperated (c) in the previous period, and column 3 
the probability of cooperating with a player who cooperated in the previous period if a game 
takes place (total cooperation choices divided by the sum of cooperation and defect choices). The 
next two columns report the forgiveness of the subject in the period after a partner defects (d), 
with Column 4 reporting the probability of proposing and column 5 reporting the probability of 
cooperation if the game is played.  Finally, column 6 reports the search dimension of the strategy 
in terms of the probability of proposing after no play; that is, the subject’s total proposals to new 
players in the current period over the number of players not linked to the subject in the previous 
period. 
The first three rows in Table 1 provide the baseline expectations of the three previously-
considered strategies for comparison with observed probabilities for different classes of subjects 
reported in the remaining rows.  QFT is as nice as possible (probability of cooperation =1) 
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because it always cooperates with new players and always proposes and cooperates with partners 
who cooperated in the previous period.  QFT is completely unforgiving (p=0) because it never 
proposes to a defecting partner and would not cooperate if somehow a game were played.  
Finally, QFT is aggressive in search, proposing to a relatively high number of new partners in 
comparison with the DNQ strategy, although what would be interpreted as a high probability 
would depend on the number of other players, the frequency of QFT-like strategies, and the 
information available about potential partners. 
DNQ is nasty, never cooperating (p=0) with new players or previous cooperators, 
although it would have no reason to not propose again to cooperators (p=1).  It is forgiving in 
terms of proposing to previous defectors, but it will never cooperate with previously cooperating 
partners.  And it has a lower probability of proposing to new players in comparison to QFT since 
it seeks only four stable mutual defection links while QFT seeks ten mutual cooperation links.   
The roving defector (RD) strategy differs from DNQ only in aggressively seeking new links and 
never proposing to defectors, both of which allow RD to continually seek new suckers.  
To classify subject strategies, each row in Table 1 reports the observed probabilities in 
the first five periods for the subject types identified on the left.   Averaging all choices over five 
periods provides a sufficiently large sample for measuring the proportions, based on the 
assumptions that a given subject employs the same conditional strategy (not the same choice) 
with all partners and that the strategy is stable over the entire period.   
Do Cooperators Play QFT? Consider first the differences in niceness between subjects 
who become members of the cooperator community and those relegated to Nash-ville, which are 
presented separately for each information condition.  The biggest difference between the two 
communities corresponds to the difference in niceness between QFT and DNQ for the two 
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strategic elements where differences are expected.  Table 1 indicates that the cooperator 
community cooperates about twice as frequently as the Nash-ville counterparts both with new 
partners (62% vs 28% averaged across conditions) and with existing partners who cooperated in 
the last period (87% vs. 46%).  The differences in niceness are critical for achieving more mutual 
cooperation in period 5 (averaging 2.26 vs 0.54), which in part accounts for the higher average 
earnings (4101 vs 2694 ECUs) for cooperators.  Since the product of all niceness probabilities 
determine the likelihood that a chance encounter with QFT will lead to a second period of mutual 
cooperation, this likelihood is about five times greater in the cooperators community (0.62 x 
0.93x 0.87=.50) than in Nash-ville (0.28 x 0.86 x 0.46= 0.11).   
Once mutual cooperation is established, it continues into the next round with a 
probability of .85 across all subjects and all periods, so the biggest difference accounting for 
more mutual cooperation payoffs in the cooperators community is the difference in commencing 
the relationship in the early periods.10
Table 1 again shows that cooperators in the local condition outperform cooperators in the 
other conditions both in terms of mutual cooperation and total earnings.  The local condition 
scores highest in all niceness elements, but since mutual cooperation is almost certain to continue 
in all conditions,
  Ironically, mutual defection continues with a probability 
of .5, which means it has only a .25, .12, and .06 chance of surviving a consecutive third, fourth 
and fifth period.  Thus low risk, low payoff exchanges are actually less stable than high risk, high 
payoff exchanges, at least when both possibilities are clearly presented to subjects! 
11
                                                          
10 Continuation probabilities are listed for each condition in online appendix 2 (attached as separate 
document for reviewers.) 
 the difference in performance must reflect differences in search efficiency.  
Information exchanged in the local conditions leads to greater observed niceness toward new 
11 If the same ratio of niceness to earnings from the local condition were applied to the other conditions, the 
number of mutual cooperation links would be 40% higher (2.92) in baseline and 50% higher (1.5) in central 
conditions.  
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partners in Table 1 (.73 for local versus .66 for baseline and .47 for central), presumably 
reflecting nice responses to new partners recommended by a cooperative partner.  In addition, 
sincere recommendations presumably increase the likelihood that the partner is also nice, and 
hence doubly magnify the likelihood of rapidly establishing mutual cooperation for QFT 
strategies.  Neither of these effects of recommendations would be relevant for nasty strategies, 
suggesting why recommendations enhance only the cooperators advantage in this experimental 
setting.  
The differences between cooperators and Nash-ville members in forgiveness and search 
are both smaller and less consistent with the QFT and DNQ strategies.  Nash-ville members are 
closer to DNQ in the forgiveness dimension where differences are expected, with Nash-ville 
subjects considerably more willing to propose a link to defectors (75% vs 59%).  But the 
cooperator community members appear much more willing to propose to defectors than expected 
in the pure QFT model, as suggested in H6.  Finally, the expected differences in search observed 
between the highest and lowest earning clusters in Figure 3 are not observed on average across 
communities or conditions.  We therefore turn next to analyzing differences in strategies between 
high and low performing subjects to better understand the roles of forgiveness and search.  
Do Top Performers Play QFT? To address this issue, the next rows in Table 1 first 
analyze the strategies of the highest-earning subjects in each condition, and then the strategies of 
the top and bottom quartile of subjects as determined by total earnings.  The strategies of the top 
performers in all three conditions strongly confirm the advantages of QFT, since they earn 
almost double the average payoffs (6670 vs 3420) by employing the niceness, vengeance, and 
aggressive search of unforgiving QFT.    Given their niceness and willingness to propose to new 
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partners, they quickly establish five to seven mutually cooperative relationships by the fifth 
period, still short of the optimal 10 for reasons discussed previously. 
Differences between the top and bottom quartile earners in the final two rows reinforce 
the critical role of niceness, since top performers differ in niceness from bottom performers by 
even greater margins than do the cooperators community and Nash-ville.  In this comparison the 
likelihood that a chance encounter with a pure QFT would develop and maintain a mutually 
cooperative relationship in the following period is even higher for top quartile earners (.8 ⅹ.95 
ⅹ .96= .73) and lower for bottom quartile earners (.24ⅹ.79ⅹ.41= .08), which again helps 
explain the greater number of mutually cooperative relationships achieved by high quartile 
earners by the fifth period (3.64 vs 0.26) and hence the greater earnings over the full 20 periods 
(5132 vs 2123).  
Although top quartile earners manifest the advantages of QFT’s niceness, like the 
cooperator community they also diverge from QFT in both search and forgiveness (H6).  As in 
the cooperative community, top quartile earners are only slightly more aggressive than bottom 
quartile earners in searching for new partners (.43 vs .38).  They are considerably less willing to 
propose to defectors (.46 to .65), although this is still far more willing than pure QFT.  In 
addition, they are actually more willing than low quartile earners to cooperate with defectors (.32 
vs .20) when a game does take place.12
                                                          
12 In short, they are more forgiving even than a pure TFT strategy which would retain links with defectors, 
but would never cooperate until the partner cooperated first. 
  In sum, the comparison of high and low performers 
confirms again that niceness is most clearly related to high performance (H2), and supports the 
contention that observed forgiveness is more likely than observed niceness to deviate from the 
pure QFT strategy (H6).  The strategies of top individual performers in each condition support 
the hypotheses that aggressive search (H4) and minimal forgiveness (H7) are associated with 
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higher performance, but the broader comparisons of the two communities and of top and bottom 
quartile earners provides more tenuous support for the importance of forgiveness and search.  
Are Forgiveness and Search Important for QFT?  The regression results reported in 
Table 2 provide another means of testing the role of niceness, forgiveness and search on a 
strategy’s performance.  The regressions use measures of strategy based on behavior in the first 
five periods to predict total earnings for the full 20 periods, so the analysis specifically tests the 
impact of early period strategies on total earnings. Niceness, forgiveness and search each 
represent the average across all relevant elements as indicated in Table 1. OLS estimates are 
reported since total earnings is distributed normally except for somewhat fatter tails, but  robust 
standard errors clustered by session are reported to account for the potential for correlated errors 
for subjects within each of the 12 session.   
To control for the known differences in performance across experimental conditions, both 
estimates in Table 2 include dummy variables for the baseline and central condition to account 
for the lower performance in those conditions in comparison to the omitted local condition, 
which is represented by the constant.  An interaction of condition with the QFT category is 
included to test for differences in effectiveness across these conditions.  Finally, we account for 
individual differences in early environments because subjects who by chance encounter a higher 
proportion of nicer strategies in the early rounds are expected to do better regardless of their 
strategy type.  Proportion nice partners measures the proportion of new partners in the first three 
rounds who cooperate initially.  
Model 1: High niceness, high search, and low forgiveness outscore other strategies. 
Attempts to directly test the impact of pure QFT and its optimistic and forgiving variants are 
hampered by the difficulty of determining an appropriate cutoff point for the QFT category, 
28 
 
since few subjects are fully nice and unforgiving.  Estimates in the first column in Table 2 
therefore test the independent impact of each dimension of strategy, and include the interaction 
of niceness with both search and forgiveness to represent QFT’s additional gain from combining 
these elements.  The QFT model would be supported with positive coefficients for niceness (H2) 
and for its interaction with search (H4) and negative coefficients for the interaction with 
forgiveness (H7).   
The coefficients for niceness, search and forgiveness indicate significant positive impacts 
of each dimension.  Since all strategy variables represent proportions with the same potential [0,1] 
range, the larger coefficient for niceness confirms a considerably greater impact of changes in 
niceness on performance, with search a distant second and changes in forgiveness having the 
least impact.  More importantly for testing H7, the interaction with forgiveness is actually 
negative and significant, confirming that vengeance rather than forgiveness increases 
performance for nice strategies like QFT.   Forgiveness improves performance for the nastiest 
strategies like DNQ who are forgiving only in terms of proposing to defectors, but increasingly 
hurts strategies as they become increasing nicer.  The interaction with search is positive as 
predicted in H4, although it is not significantly greater than the positive impact of search even 
for nasty strategies. 
The interactions are perhaps easiest to see in Figure 4, which plots the change in 
estimated performance as forgiveness increases for subjects with the four combinations of low (0) 
and high (1) levels of both niceness and search.13
                                                          
13 The extreme conditions are portrayed in order to compare pure QFT with DNQ, even though a value of 
zero is not plausible for search since it would lead to no games.  Since the equation is linear, any intermediate values 
can be readily imagined by shifting the lines between the extremes. 
  The highest performance is achieved by the 
nicest subjects with the highest search (solid blue line) and lowest forgiveness (leftmost point) 
that most closely resemble pure QFT. DNQ-like nasty strategies with low search (dashed purple 
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line) but high forgiveness (rightmost point) earn less than 50% of QFT (3.6 vs 7.8), and even 
with the highest search (dashed green line) earns at best less than 60% of QFT (4.6 vs 7.8).  For 
nasty subjects, increases in forgiveness and search improve performance.  For nice subjects, on 
the other hand, forgiveness actually lowers scores.  In sum, the highest search and lowest 
forgiveness are both critical for QFT’s performance; a complete shift to the lowest search would 
decrease estimated performance to 71% of QFT’s earnings (5.6 vs 7.8), while a shift to complete 
forgiveness would decrease estimated performance to 85% (6.6 vs 7.8).  
Model 2: High Search and Low Forgiveness are required for QFT performance.  A more 
direct test of the importance of search and forgiveness for QFT is attempted in the second model 
in Table 2, which reports results for a QFT5050 dummy that equals one whenever niceness >.5 
and forgiveness<.5.  This generous cutoff identifies 46 subjects with QFT-like strategies.  Less 
generous cutoffs (e.g. above 75th percentile in both niceness and forgiveness) yielded too few 
subjects to meaningfully test the role of forgiveness and search within the QFT component.  The 
significant interaction terms in Model 2 confirm that higher search and lower forgiveness 
significantly improve performance for subjects in the QFT5050 category, although QFT5050 
itself did not significantly outperform other strategies.  The range of niceness and forgiveness 
included in QFT5050 are apparently too broad to capture the full advantages of QFT in 
comparison with other strategies comparable in independent dimensions of niceness, search and 
forgiveness.  Only when combined with higher search and lower forgiveness do QFT5050 
subjects outperform others, underscoring the importance of combining niceness, unforgivingness, 
and optimistic search as QFT does.  
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Selection, Learning and the Structure of Cooperation 
Returning to our policy example, the experimental results suggest that risky high-value 
trades can emerge and be sustained to the extent that a sufficient number of stakeholders who 
have developed nice, vengeful, QFT-like strategies elsewhere transfer these strategies to new 
voluntary dilemmas.  Cooperation emerges most rapidly when strategies aggressively seek 
appropriate partners, particularly in institutional settings allowing partners to share 
recommendations about other potential partners. 
Our analysis finds that mutual cooperation in sustaining high risk, high value exchanges 
occurs primarily within clusters of cooperators, that subjects in these clusters pursue strategies 
with niceness similar to QFT, and that in general the best-performing strategies are those that 
combine niceness with the aggressive search  and unforgiving vengeance of the QFT model.  
Thus the simple QFT model predicts experimental outcomes remarkably well, at least for the 
newly-forming exchange arenas with predefined trade options and a relatively restricted 
population reresented in the experiment.  
Note that the clustering of cooperation in the QFT model is dependent only on the  ability 
of nice strategies to find and maintain cooperative relationships while rejecting defectors; 
selection creates clusters of QFT, while clustering does not (by definition) enhance cooperation.  
Furthermore, clustering will decrease with the ratio of available QFT strategies to the optimum 
number of partners sought; in sufficiently large populations a QFT player may find the optimum 
number of partners with no clustering, so no partners would know the other partners.  Of course, 
if partners can share recommendations as in the local experimental condition, clustering is likely 
to emerge even in large populations.  In short, the structure of cooperative exchanges will be 
determined by the nature of the selection process.  A dynamic network model (Jackson 2009) 
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that specifies the information available about potential partners, the selection strategies available 
to players, and the distribution of QFT and other strategy types could be developed to analyze 
patterns of pairwise stable outcomes that could then be compared with observed patterns of high-
value exchange under the specified conditions.  
In newly-emerging voluntary dilemma exchange arenas, the experimental results suggest 
that the levels and patterns of high value, risky exchanges will be most affected by selection 
effects among preexisting strategy types, at least in the short run represented in the experiment. 
To the extent that potential partners transfer at least some QFT-like strategies learned in other 
arenas, the emergence of a cooperative community and Nash-ville is likely to be observed, 
particularly in smaller exchange arenas.   
The results challenge the relevance rather than the truth of the established argument that 
clusters of exchange relationships positively influence the likelihood of cooperation in 
involuntary dilemmas (Coleman 1988, Granovetter 1985).  Once cooperative clusters emerge in 
the experiment, they could potentially encourage greater niceness among Nash-ville subjects and 
eventually absorb reformed DNQ players into the higher-value exchange communities.  Indeed, 
we can find instances of initially nasty subjects who successfully join the cooperators 
community. 
Unfortunately, the increasingly-nasty environment produced by the QFT selection 
process makes this transformation very difficult within the short time frame represented by the 
experiment.  By the time that nasty subjects realize the instability even of mutual defection and 
adapt a nicer approach they are increasingly likely to encounter exploitation, sometimes even by 
those in the cooperators community already maintaining a full set of mutually cooperative 
exchanges.  In richer informational contexts and longer time frames, perhaps all low-value 
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traders will eventually understand and seek the advantages of high-value trade within the 
cooperators community. Even then, the problem of coordinating on higher paying QFT strategies 
imposes the very difficult problem of achieving pareto superior outcomes in weak-link games 
(e.g., Brandts, Cooper and Fatas, 2007). Perhaps the most critical remaining challenge in 
understanding cooperation in voluntary dilemmas is to explain the conditions under which these 
Nash-ville subjects can transform themselves in order to enhance the benefits of exchange within 
new cooperative communities.   
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Table 1. Cooperative Community and High Earners Play Quit-for-Tat 
 
 
DIMENSIONS OF QFT 
(probabilities) 
EARNING AND        
MUTUAL 
COOPERATION 
              Niceness                  Forgiveness Search _____           ____ 
Type of Subject C after no play  
Propose 
after c 
C after 
c 
Propose 
after d 
C 
after d 
Propose 
after no 
play  
Total 
Earning
* 
CC in 
period 
5** 
 ---------- ---------- --------- --------- -------- --------- --------- ------------ 
EXPECTATIONS FOR 
STRATEGIES          
QFT 1 1 1 0 0 high 
 
10 
DNQ 0 1 0 1 0 low 
 
0 
RD 0 1 0 0 0 high 
 
0 
COOPERATOR 
COMMUNITY         
Baseline 0.66  0.93  0.90  0.53  0.34  0.43  3969  2.12 
Local 0.73  0.96  0.92  0.63  0.29  0.44  5116  3.47 
Central 0.47  0.90  0.79  0.61  0.19  0.41  3219  1.19 
NASHVILLE         
Baseline 0.30  0.86  0.55  0.76  0.11  0.44  2757  0.74 
Local 0.30  0.81  0.36  0.73  0.14  0.45  2935  0.46 
Central 0.25  0.90  0.47  0.77  0.16  0.42  2389  0.41 
HIGHEST EARNER IN  
 
 
     Baseline 1 1 1 0 N/A 0.70 6934 7 
Local 0.82 0.95 1 0.17 0 0.56 6631 5 
Central 1 1 1 0 N/A 0.60 6443  6 
 
 
 
 
     TOP QUARTILE 
EARNERS*** 0.80 0.95 0.96 0.46 0.32 0.43 5132 3.64 
BOTTOM QUARTILE 
EARNERS 0.24 0.79 0.41 0.65 0.20 0.38 2123 0.26 
  
 
Notes:  Probabilities to propose a link and to cooperate are calculated for period 1 to 5, total earnings are 
for the entire 20 periods, and mutual cooperation links are the average per subject in period 5. Probability 
to cooperate is conditional on the game being played, so includes only decisions in the set of games 
played in the period being evaluated. Thus probability to cooperate after no link includes total number of 
cooperate decisions divided by the total number of games played with alters who did not play with subject 
in the previous period.  
* Treatment averages: 3298(baseline), 4182(local) and 2789(central) 
**  Treatment averages: 1.6 (baseline), 2.2(local) and 0.8(central) 
*** Quartile earners for each treatment (thus, the top and bottom 14 subjects in each treatment) 
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Table 2 
Impact of Niceness, Forgiveness and Search on Experimental Payoffs 
(Dependent variable: total payoffs, in 1000 ECU units) 
 
 
Notes:  Regression analyses are clustered by experimental session for 165 subjects.  Dependent 
variable is total payoff for session in 1000 ECUs, where 400 ECUs = $1(check). Bold entries are 
significant at p<.05 
 
  
  Strategic Dimensions  QFT5050 
 Coefficients Robust 
Standard 
Error 
 Coefficients Robust 
Standard 
Error 
Strategic Dimensions      
   Niceness 2.44 0.46  1.78 0.34 
   Search 0.98 0.43  1.23 0.32 
   Forgiveness 0.50 0.22  0.08 0.29 
Interactions      
   Niceness x Search 1.28 0.95  --  
   Niceness x Forgiveness -1.69 0.46  --  
   QFT5050 --   0.10 0.43 
   QFT5050 x Search --   2.12 0.60 
   QFT5050 x Forgive --   -2.19 0.54 
Environment      
   Proportion Nice Partners 1.16 0.32  1.16 0.26 
   Baseline -0.54 0.16  -0.53 0.13 
   Central -0.68 0.35  -0.71 0.30 
   QFT5050x Baseline --   -0.19 0.49 
   QFT5050 x Central --   0.21 0.28 
Constant 1.46 0.38  1.66 0.28 
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Figure 1 
 
The Cooperators’ Community and Nash-Ville: 
Cooperate and Defect Choices in Period 17  
 
(Cooperate=solid black, Defect=dotted red)  
 
Session 1      Session 2 
      
 
Session 3      Session 4 
 
      
 
Notes: These sociograms are produced with the Netdraw program from UCINET.  Circles 
represent the 14 subjects in each session, with the diameter representing the subject’s total 
earnings.  Arrows represent decisions to cooperate (solid black) or to defect (dotted red), with 
arrowheads pointing away from decisionmaker toward the target of the choice.  The circles have 
been placed manually to emphasize the clustering of the cooperators’ community.  
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Figure 3 
 
Comparison of Proposal Patterns for  
Nash-ville and Cooperators Cluster. 
 
             
            
Note:   
The numbers of proposals per member of the cluster are indicated by triangles for 
proposals to new partners, circles for proposals to partners who cooperated and “x” for partners 
who defected in the previous period. The resultant links per member are indicated by the line. 
As explained in the text, each session is divided into a cooperators cluster and Nash-ville 
using TABU optimization procedure in UCINET, returning a total of 8 clusters for each 
treatment. The highest scoring cooperators cluster belongs to session 3 and has 8 subjects. The 
lowest scoring Nash-ville has 6 members and belongs to session 2.   
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Figure 4 
 
 
 
Note: Predictions are calculated for the Local Condition based on coefficients in the first column of Table 
2, with Niceness = 1 for Nice and 0 for nasty strategies and search = 1 for high search and 0 for low 
search, and Proportion Nice Partners = .5068, the mean value across all sessions 
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